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Abstract We analyze the risk levels chosen by agents who have private information
regarding their quality, and whose performance will be judged and rewarded by
outsiders. Assume that risk choice is observable. Agents will choose risk
strategically to enhance their expected reputations. We show that conspicuous
conservatism results: agents of different qualities choose levels below those that
would be chosen if quality were observable. This happens because bad agents must
cloak their identity by choosing the same risk level as good agents, and good agents
are more likely to distinguish themselves if they reduce the risk level. Our results
contrast starkly with those for the case when risk choice cannot be observed.
Keywords Risk choice . Signaling . Conservatism
JEL Classification D81 . D82 . G30
Many economic activities secure both immediate returns and rewards to reputation. For
example, a company that bolsters earnings gets not only those monies, but the reward of
a higher price/earnings ratio and hence a higher stock price. Mutual funds that perform
well get an inflow of funds. In some cases, a player’s reputation reward will swamp any
benefits from his immediate return. In the corporate context, there may be a “cash out”
event, such as the sale of the whole company. For a divisionmanager, a big promotion or
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a strong outside offer would play much the same role. This paper addresses situations
where reputations are a heavily weighted consideration.
Asymmetric information drives our analysis. We assume that each player,
hereafter agent, knows his quality, but others do not. His reputation will be inferred
from his risk choice and the payoff that results. Our central question in this paper is
how much risk good and bad agents will choose. Given that there are significant
reputation rewards, we argue that even risk-neutral players will choose their risk
level strategically. They will sacrifice some expected direct payoff in the hope of
burnishing their reputations.
We look at situations where players’ risk choices are observable. Transactions in
which corporations are sold well illustrate this case. Financial markets can see whether
a retail chain attempted to expand rapidly—swifter expansion entails higher risk—or
how diversified a Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) is across metropolitan areas.
The sequence of moves is as follows: 1. The agent chooses his risk level, and that
is observable to all. 2. Both the agent and outsiders learn the outcome. 3. The
outsiders then contract with the agent based on the inference they draw from what
they observe. That is, outsiders update their assessment of the agent using two
signals: (1) the lottery outcome, and (2) the level of risk chosen, which serves as a
“signal” in the Spence (1974) sense. We show that: First, agents will often pool on
their risk choice. Second, when they do, all agents, regardless of type, are induced
into conspicuous conservatism. That is, all agents will choose a level of risk below
the one that would maximize their expected direct payoff. That is because good
agents are in the driver’s seat; low risk levels help them distinguish themselves. Bad
agents must choose low risk levels as well, lest they reveal their type.
We proceed as follows. “The model” presents the model. “Results” develops our
results. “Conclusion” concludes.
1 The model
We assume that agents have private information regarding their quality. Agents care
about the lottery outcome because they stand to gain from the reputation they
acquire among outsiders, based in part on the lottery that they choose, and in part on
the lottery outcome.
Agents choose a level of risk for their activity. We assume the risk choice to be
continuous. Formally, each agent chooses from a one-dimensional family of random
variables indexed by its variance, V, where V < V < V .
The choice of V is common knowledge. That is, outsiders who are drawing
inferences about the agent’s type, see V, and update accordingly. By contrast, when
the risk choices by agents are unobservable, the situation considered earlier by
Degeorge et al. (2004), hereafter DMZ, the results are quite different. The prime
concepts in this paper, such as signaling strategies, and pooling and separating
equilibria, do not apply. To facilitate contrasts, we follow the features of the DMZ
model, with one crucial difference: In our setting risk choice is observable.
The random variable exV represents first-period performance (say, the test score, or
company earnings). It is distributed normally with variance V and mean
m V ; qð Þ ¼ m Vð Þ þ q, where θ indexes the agent’s type. We will refer to the θ=0
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type agent as bad and the θ=Δ type as good, where Δ>0. The prior probability that
an agent is of the good type, denoted by p, is common knowledge, as is the mean-
variance schedule μ(V).
Each agent chooses a point on the mean-variance schedule given by μ(V) and for
given V an agent of type θ has performance
ex  N m Vð Þ þ q;Vð Þ:
We posit that μ(V) is single-peaked, with its maximum at internal point V*, and
concave, i.e., the marginal benefit of adding variance decreases throughout, turning
negative beyond V*. In fact, the mere existence of an interior maximum is sufficient
for most of our theoretical results.1 The existence of such an interior maximum follows
naturally from the usual assumption that agents have only a finite amount of favorable
lotteries.2 Our theoretical results, apart from Claim 3, do not assume concavity. Single-
peakedness of μ(V) is assumed for the proof of Claim 1 and Claim 3.3
It is convenient (though by no means essential) to assume that μ Vð Þ ! 1
as V ! V or V ! V , and we maintain this assumption throughout.
At the beginning of period 0, an agent learns his type, and then chooses his desired
variance V. His random performance x is then drawn according to the equation above,
reaped by him, and observed by all, and the period ends. At the beginning of period 1,
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1 It is important that μ0 0ð Þ > 0. Otherwise, good types would merely choose zero risk, and bad types
would have to follow. This condition at 0 is also plausible. Making money in this world inevitably requires
risk taking.
2 Consider for example a company choosing investment projects. A special case occurs when the
projects are fixed in size and independent, with some having positive expected returns, others negative
returns, and the manager has no budget constraint. In this case μ Vð Þ will be single-peaked and concave,
implying that the manager will allocate funds to every project that offers a positive expected return. Doing
so will yield the peak of the μ Vð Þ curve. If the manager wishes to increase variance, he will invest in the
project with the lowest absolute value of the mean-to-variance ratio. Once this opportunity to add variance
is exhausted (by the finite size assumption) the manager picks the second lowest mean-to-variance ratio
project and the process continues.
3 In fact, a weaker condition than global single-peakedness of μ Vð Þ is sufficient for these results to obtain
(details are available from the authors).
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All agents are assumed to be risk-neutral, so that in a full-information setting agents
would choose the mean-maximizing level of variance V*.4 We assume risk neutrality
to facilitate exposition and because we are confident the same qualitative results would
apply—namely agents tilting toward conservatism in risk choice—if agents were risk
averse, as is normally assumed. We investigate how asymmetric information leads to
departures from this optimum. Choosing a variance less than V* represents risk-
reducing behavior; choosing a variance greater than V* would increase risk.
We can formulate the last step in the game as the sale by the agent of his capital—
human, organizational or intellectual—to a new long-term owner. It will clearly be
optimal for the new owner to choose the level of variance V* that maximizes
expected performance (we assume risk-neutrality throughout), so the expected return
to an agent of type θ from next period onward is
P1
t¼1
μ V ð Þþθ
1þrð Þt ¼
μ V ð Þþθ
r where r is the
discount rate. Thus, the expected present value (performance plus expected price) of








E θ jall available information½ ;
where buyers use Bayesian analysis to compute the expectation term.
















If θ were observable, this problem would be trivial; we would have
E θ j all available information ¼ θ;½
and agents would always set V=V*. We consider the case where θ is private
information, so the agent is faced with a trade-off in maximizing its expected total
payoff: clearly, setting V=V* maximizes the expected performance; however,
deviating from V* will change the information that flows to outsiders, and has the
potential to increase the expected reputation.
2 Results
All proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
In a standard signaling game, e.g., Cho and Kreps (1987), outsiders draw
inferences from an agent’s choice, e.g., whether he goes to college. Our model adds
one stage to a standard signaling game; namely a performance signal x that is
produced by a probabilistic process, and that is revealed to all. The agent receives
the direct payment x, plus their expected price from an outsider. Total payment is
given by the random variable




E qjV ;ex½ :
4 For a state-of-the art exposition of decision theory under risk aversion, see Gollier (2004a).
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We consider only pure strategy equilibria. When both types of agents choose the
same V, a pooling equilibrium results. When agents choose different V’s, a
separating equilibrium emerges. Even in a pooling equilibrium, the current
performance is informative about each agent’s type. Thus our model involves both
signaling and signal-jamming. The choice of variance is the signal in the Spence
(1974) sense. The lottery outcome is the performance signal. Its degree of
informativeness can be attenuated through a choice of high variance. When risk
choice is observable, however, agents cannot surreptitiously manipulate variance,
and we shall see that bad agents have a strong incentive to mimic the good agents’
choices of risk.
We posit no exogenous difference in costs between types: such differences are the
factor that drives ordinary signaling models.5 Instead, we find that an endogenous
reputational difference emerges between types. That is, the good type has less to
gain by deviating from the mean-maximizing variance choice than does the bad type,
because, as the good type wishes, his ability will be revealed partly through his
performance.
Outsider beliefs play an important role here, as they do in standard signaling
games. First, after observing an agent’s choice of variance V, outsiders update their
prior probability p that the agent is good to a posterior ξ(p, V) via Bayesian updating
(where possible). Second, after observing the agent’s performance x, outsiders then
further update ξ to a new posterior bx x; xð Þ, using Bayesian updating.
So an agent of type θ=0 or Δ who chooses variance V expects a total payoff of
9θ Vð Þ ¼ μ Vð Þ þ θþ 1r μ

V*
þ $E bξ ξ p;Vð Þ;exð Þθ;Vh i :
2.1 Pooling equilibria




E bξ p; xð Þj0; bVh i  μ V*ð Þ  μ bV 
The set of bV values leading to a pooling equilibrium includes V* and forms a union
of closed intervals.
The left hand side (LHS) of the inequality represents the gain to a bad agent of
pooling at bV instead of choosing its mean-maximizing variance, V*, and thereby
admitting up front to being bad. The right hand side (RHS) is the cost, in foregone
performance, of choosing bV rather than the mean-maximizing value. For bV to be an
equilibrium it must be the case that both types value the returns to pooling more than
the cost of pooling, i.e. prefer pooling. It is easy to see that if the bad type prefers bV
to V*, so does the good type, since the good type has a higher expected reputation
5 Cheap talk models (Crawford and Sobel 1982) assume costless signaling. However, they apply to
situations in which parties have partially aligned interests. In our setting, the interests of the signalers and
the observers diverge.
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from pooling but pays the same price for deviating from V*. If bV is equal to V*, then
the right hand side of the inequality is equal to zero while the left hand side is always
non-negative, so V* itself is always a pooling equilibrium.
Welfare and efficiency properties of pooling equilibria Relative to the full information
case, signaling through one’s choice of risk reduces aggregate welfare. The
manipulation of reputations is a negative-sum game among bad and good agents.
Consider the “expected reputation”—defined formally below—over the two types of
agents. This expectation must equal the prior reputation. Therefore any improvement in
the expected reputation of one type of agent will exactly cancel out the corresponding
deterioration for the other. However, since agents depart from the performance-
maximizing varianceV* in order to enhance their reputations, value in direct payoffs is
sacrificed, and the net efficiency effect is negative.6
Claim 2 formalizes the comparison of equilibria. Informally, good agents will
prefer to pool at lower variance because it enables them to better distinguish
themselves from bad agents. Bad agents will prefer to pool at high variance, since
noisier performance makes it more likely that bad agents will produce performance
common to good agents. Using this result, we show that in general there exists a
continuum of Pareto-unranked pooling equilibria, although some such equilibria are
Pareto-ranked.7 In particular, so long as it is increasingly costly to add risk, there will
always be a pooling equilibrium at a variance higher than V*, which is Pareto-
dominated by pooling at V*.
Definition Given a pooling equilibrium bV ; bV , the expected reputation in this
equilibrium of an agent of type θ is defined as:
ER μ; bV ; θ  ¼ $E bξ p;exð Þθ; bVh i
¼ R þ11 $bξ p; xjμ; bV f xjμþ θ; bV dx:
Thus ER m; bV ; q  gives the Bayesian estimate of the expected value of θ,
conditional on observing the draw, if the agent is in fact of type θ. Herebx p; xjm; bV  is the posterior probability that the agent is good when p was the
prior probability and x was observed, while f jm; bV  is the density function
associated with a normally distributed random variable with mean μ and variance bV .
Claim 2 Given two pooling equilibria bV1; bV1  and bV2; bV2 , if bV1 < bV2 then good
agents have a higher expected reputation under bV1 than under bV2 (so bad agents have
a lower expected reputation).
6 If, as before, we write 9B bV ;9G bV  for the payoffs of bad and good agents respectively in a pooling
equilibrium bV ; bV , then the expected total payoff over all agents (normalizing the number of agents to
one) satisfies pE9G bV þ 1 pð ÞE9B bV  ¼ μ bV þ 1r μ V ð Þ þ 1þ 1r pΔ.
7 Equilibria are said to be “Pareto-ranked” if one Pareto-dominates the other.
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In other words, as the signal becomes noisier, bad agents are better able to hide
their type, and good agents less able to reveal theirs. We can make a number of
general observations about the payoff profiles generated by different pooling
equilibria. Figure 1, which is drawn for the case where good agents comprise one
half of the population, illustrates.
Claim 3
(1) For ɛ small and positive, the pooling equilibrium

V* þ ";V* þ " gives the




(point B on Figure 1), and the bad agent a strictly higher payoff. The opposite is
true for pooling at

V*  ";V*  ". In particular, this means that there is a
Fig. 1 Welfare and efficiency properties of pooling equilibria
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continuum of Pareto-unranked pooling equilibria (the portion of the curve in
Figure 1 between points A and C).
(2) If V* < bV1 < bV2, then the good agent strictly prefers bV1 to bV2. WheneverbV1 < bV2 a good agent always gains more, or loses less, than a bad agent from a
move to the lower variance equilibrium:
9G bV1 9G bV2  > 9B bV1 9B bV2 
or, equivalently, d9G
.
dbV < d9B.dbV .
(3) If the marginal cost of taking on variance is increasing (μ(v) is concave), then
there are always pooling equilibria that are weakly (point D on Figure 1) and
strongly Pareto-dominated (point E) by pooling at (V*,V*) (point B).
(4) There exists V 0 < V* such that V 0;V 0ð Þ is a pooling equilibrium (point A on
Figure 1), and gives the highest payoff to good agents out of all possible
equilibria.
2.1.1 Three observations
1. The expected payoff in this game consists of two portions: the immediate payoff
and the reputation. Averaged across types the posterior reputation has to be the
same as the prior, so that V only affects the expected direct payoff averaged
across types, which is maximized at V*. Hence pooling at V* maximizes the
aggregate expected payoff of all agents. That is, of any pooling equilibrium, it
gives the highest value of p9G þ 1 pð Þ9B, so the tangent to the graph of
payoff profiles at point B in Figure 1 is given by the equi-payoff line through B,





þ p$Þ: Other equi-
payoff lines are parallel to this one.
2. Figure 1 shows a region of Pareto-ranked low-variance equilibria to the left of A
on the curve. However, there is no simple general condition on m Vð Þ that
guarantees its existence; that is, for low variance equilibria there is no analog to
part (3) of Claim 3.




B Vð Þ , so
from part (2) of Claim 3 we can deduce that the curve is flatter than 45° to the
left of A, and steeper than 45° to the left and below C.
2.1.2 Equilibrium selection
As is common in signaling models, we have a continuum of equilibria. Alas,
standard equilibrium refinements are not effective here. Focal point theory
(Schelling 1960) may help the good agents coordinate on a beneficial outcome.
Pareto optimality is a salient property, which suggests some location on the frontier
between A and C. Point V 0;V 0ð Þ, here represented by point A, stands out. It is
readily recognizable as the best equilibrium for the good agents. Moreover the cost
of deviating from it to a higher variance is less for bad agents than for good,
suggesting that deviators will be branded as bad. Given the prominence of V 0;V 0ð Þ
8 J Risk Uncertainty (2007) 35:1–16
for good agents, they could readily coordinate in choosing it, whether on a tacit or
open basis, and bad agents would have no place else to go.8
2.2 Separating equilibria
The driving force behind separating equilibria in signaling models is cost differences
across types. But our model has no such differences. Although two separating
equilibria exist—in both the bad type chooses V*—neither is consistent with
intuition or the Banks and Sobel (1987) “divinity” equilibrium refinement, and we
rule these equilibria out on these grounds.
Claim 4 This game has exactly two separating equilibria in pure strategies, in which
the good type chooses Vg and the bad type chooses V*(see Figure 2). In one
separating equilibrium, the good type chooses Vg1 < V
*; in the other, Vg2 > V
*. In
each of these equilibria, both types are indifferent between choosing Vg and
choosing V* (equivalently, for both types, the incentive compatibility constraint
binds). Neither equilibrium is consistent with the Banks–Sobel “divinity” equilib-
rium refinement (extended to this model in a natural way).
These separating equilibria are intuitively unappealing. First, the good type is
indifferent between its own strategy and that of the bad type, even though the market
assigns probability 1 to its being of the bad type if it chooses V*. If there were any
probability that the market expected the agents to pool at V*, then a deviation to V*
8 Formally, we are considering a one-play game. Deviations from an equilibrium, however, implicitly
invoke repeated play, with deviators accepting a current loss hoping to get to a better equilibrium. At
V 0;V 0ð Þ, good agents are already at their preferred equilibrium. Bad agents, by contrast, have an incentive
to jostle the V 0;V 0ð Þ equilibrium, since they prefer any other Pareto-optimal equilibrium. This reinforces
the expectation that deviators will be branded as bad, which makes the V 0;V 0ð Þ equilibrium more secure.
Fig. 2 Separating equilibria
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would be (in an unformalized sense) a dominant strategy for the good type. We
therefore rule out these separating equilibria.9
2.3 Discussion
Our results suggest that when the level of risk chosen by agents is conspicuous to
outsiders, and thus functions as a signal in the Spence (1974) sense, agents will often
pool at levels of risk below the performance-maximizing level, since good agents
prefer that performance reveal true quality. For a bad agent, increasing noise in the
hope of clouding the picture is a pointless venture. That very choice would admit to
his low quality.
Strategies that reduce the noise of a signal are well known to induce significant
amounts of pooling in various contexts. Thus, students applying to elite colleges that
do not require the SAT know that not taking it conveys negative information about
their type.
Our conspicuous conservatism argument might also explain the strong resistance
of some institutions to change. Consider the French higher education system marked
by “grandes écoles,” the springboards for most of the French elite. The system was
essentially invented in Napoleon’s time and it can be argued that it has evolved little
since, despite cogent criticisms of its operation. What could account for such
stability? In order to enter a “grande école” students must pass a series of
examinations that provide a rather precise assessment of ability. Any alternative
educational system—such as one that would put less emphasis on testing students
upfront and more emphasis on student learning, for example—faces huge hurdles in
establishing itself. Students opting for such an alternative system would automat-
ically be labeled as bad. In fact, many students with little chance of entering a
“grande école” try anyway, in the small hope of securing the good label.
For bad types, conservatism pays if it is conspicuous. In contrast, given that the
agent’s choice of risk is unobservable in the situation studied by DMZ, it cannot
function there as a Spence-type signal. Outsiders only observe the outcome x of the
lottery. This prior work shows that in such contexts, good agents choose low levels
of risk, and bad agents choose high levels—provided outsiders have no strong priors
about whether agents are good or bad. Good agents are seeking to reduce noise so as
to stand out. Bad agents are seeking to increase noise in the hope of producing the
results of good agents. For example, a strong student might choose a low-risk
strategy, e.g., avoiding guesses on a multiple-choice test that deducts for wrong
answers, so as to reduce noise and maximize information flow. A weak student
might choose otherwise. A somewhat similar intuition emerges from the work of
Tsetlin, Gaba and Winkler (2004). They analyze the strategic choice of risk in
multiround contests, and contests with handicaps (but without private information).
9 How robust are these results to our assumption that Δ, the difference in expected return between good
and bad types, is constant across risk levels? If the difference were multiplicative instead of additive, our
results would be reinforced; imitation of the good type by the bad would become less costly. In contrast, if
the gap in expected performance between types increased as they reduced their variance from V*,
separation would become possible. The good type could go where the bad could not afford to follow.
10 J Risk Uncertainty (2007) 35:1–16
They find that contestants in a weak position (e.g., low mean, high handicap, or low
previous performance in a multiround contest) should maximize risk, and those in a
strong position should minimize it.10 In this vein, Chevalier and Ellison (1997)
document that mutual fund managers with poor January-September performance
increase the risk of their investment strategy in the fourth quarter, while managers
with strong year-to-date performance reduce it. At a cost, investors have the potential
to assess the risk associated with a manager’s portfolio choice, since portfolios are
announced periodically. Since poor first-half performers select distinctively high risk
levels, presumably not many investors accept the cost to do such monitoring. Were
rating firms like Morningstar to make risk assessments of mutual funds widely and
cheaply available, gambles to “catch up” in the second half of the year would
become less common.
3 Conclusion
We analyzed the levels of risk good and bad agents take on when they know their
quality but outsiders do not. If the agents’ risk choices are observed by outsiders,
then, invoking reasonable criteria about market beliefs, a single pooling equilibrium
is likely to emerge. Good types set the standard, so they select the equilibrium that is
most favorable for them. At it, both good and bad types will choose a risk level
below the one that maximizes their respective expected performance. We conclude
that when risk choice is observable, agents with private information on their quality
face strong incentives—regardless of their quality—to pick performance lotteries
with low risk. When risk choice is conspicuous, conservatism helps good types
separate themselves. Bad types will not like the equilibrium. Nevertheless, they will
choose conservatism because that is better than maximizing their expected outcome
but admitting their type.
Appendix
Proof of Claim 1 Suppose that bV gives such a pooling equilibrium. It is easy to see
that if any out-of-equilibrium market beliefs support this equilibrium, then the
extreme beliefs that set ξ(V)=0 for all V not equal to bV also support it, so let us
suppose that the latter are the market’s beliefs. In that case, the most attractive
deviation from bV must be V*. Therefore, necessary and sufficient conditions for
incentive compatibility are that for both types we have










, $E bξ p; xð Þθ; bVh i  r μ V*  μ bV  :
10 Gollier (2004b) studies risk-choice externalities of a quite different sort, namely when an individual’s
marginal utility changes with the average consumption of others. Assume a positive relationship, the
plausible case. Then the individual will be less tolerant of personal risks and more tolerant of market risks
and collective gambles than he would be in the absence of such externalities.
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Clearly the left side of the last inequality is larger for the good type than for the bad
type, implying that if the bad type does not want to deviate then neither does the
good. It follows that this inequality with θ set equal to 0 provides a necessary and
sufficient condition for bV to be an equilibrium, as stated in the proposition.11
It is also clear that the left hand side is bounded while the right hand side goes to
infinity as V approaches its upper or lower bounds, and that at bV ¼ V* the inequality
is satisfied (with strict inequality). Q.E.D.
Proof of Claim 2 We need to show that, when comparing different pooling equilibria,













The former result for good agents follows immediately from the latter.
Recall that we defined the expected reputation to be
ER μ;σ2; θ
  ¼ Z þ1
1
$bξ p; x μ;σ2  f x μþ θ;σ2 dx:
This expression is independent of μ, since adding the same constant to both agents’
performance cannot affect their expected reputation. Formally, one just notes that the

















so we need only prove the result for the partial derivatives. In order to do so, note
that the Bayesian posterior probability distribution is given by






11 Notice that a Cho-Kreps “intuitive”-like criterion would not rule out these extreme beliefs. For suppose
there are any unspecified beliefs that would make the good type deviate to some V. Then certainly the
beliefs that attach probability 1 that any agent that plays V is good would make the bad type play V
(because these beliefs would make the good type play V, and would do more for the bad type than the
good type). Thus there is no “intuitive” reason to rule out such extreme beliefs.
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so we can write
ER μ;σ2; 0















Setting y ¼ xms yields
ER μ;σ2; 0






































We now make a further substitution, setting z ¼ yþ $σ to give
@ER
@σ μ;σ
2; 0ð Þ ¼ AR 11η zð Þ2 z 2$σ ez2=2dz;









and η zð Þ ¼ 1þ 1pp e$ z=σ3$=2σ
2ð Þ:





  ¼ A
Z1
2$=σ

















Using the transformation z0 ¼ 4$=σ z turns the latter into an integral over
2$=σ;1½ , so we can combine the two to get
@ER
@σ μ;σ













2=2η zð Þ2η 4$=σ zð Þ2
η 4$=σ zð Þ2  η zð Þ2e4$z=σ8$2=σ2
h i
dz:
To show that the above expression is positive, it is therefore sufficient to show
that the integrand is negative, or equivalently, that
η 4$=σ zð Þ2  η zð Þ2e4$z=σ8$2=σ2 < 0:
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This expression can be factored as
 t2  1ð Þ 1þ 2ut þ t2ð Þ; where
t ¼ e$ z=σ2$=σ2ð Þ > 1; and
u ¼ 1pp e$
2=2σ2 > 0:






Since we must have
pER μ;σ2;$
 þ 1 pð ÞER μ;σ2; 0  ¼ p$;






Proof of Claim 3
(1) As long as μ(V) is differentiable, the cost in terms of expected revenue of
moving ɛ away from V* is initially of second order in ɛ, while the change in
expected reputation is of the first order.
(2) Moving toward V* from the right gives the good type both a higher expected
performance and a better expected reputation, and hence increases its total
expected payoff. For the more general result, note that moving to a lower V has
the same effect on the expected performance of both types of agents, but
increases the expected reputation of the good type while it hurts the expected
reputation of the bad type.
(3) Consider the payoff 9B Vð Þto the bad type from both types' pooling at a value V,
ignoring for the moment the question of whether or not V actually gives an
equilibrium (that is, whether or not pooling at V is incentive-compatible). We
have just shown in the proof of part (1) that 90B > 0 at V*. However, if we
assume that the marginal cost, in expected revenue forgone, increases as we raise
V higher and higher, then we will eventually have 90B < 0 and reach a point bV
with 9B
bV ¼ 9BV* (point D in Figure 1). Pooling at this value is an equi-
librium. To show that this is so, we need only check that the incentive-
compatibility condition of Claim 1 holds. By definition of bV we have











þ $:E bξ p; xð Þ0;V*h i :




E bξ p; xð Þ0;bvh i ¼ μ V*  μ bV þ $
r
E bξ p; xð Þ0;V*h i > μ V*  μ bV :
In other words, since the bad type is indifferent between pooling at bV and pooling at
V*, it will strictly prefer pooling at bV to deviating to V*, as the latter is strictly worse
than pooling at V* (since deviating to V* will lead to an expected reputation of 0).
Since the incentive-compatibility condition holds with strict inequality at bV , an
equilibrium also exists at bV þ ". This equilibrium will be worse for the bad type than
pooling at bV ,12 hence worse than pooling at V*. We know by part (2) that bV is also
worse for the good type than V*, so it is strictly dominated by V* as claimed. Q.E.D.
(4) Since the set of pooling equilibria is closed (by Claim 1) and those equilibria
with V>V* give the good type a lower payoff than V*, there must be a pooling
value V’ (not necessarily unique) that maximizes the payoff to good agents over
all pooling equilibria.
Proof of Claim 4 Suppose we have a separating equilibrium, which we can denote
(Vb,Vg), where Vb and Vg are the equilibrium choices of the bad and good types
respectively. If Vb≠V*, then deviating to V* improves the bad agent’s expected
performance and cannot damage its “equilibrium reputation” $E θ Vb; xj½ , since
separation means that the agent’s type is fully revealed in equilibrium (so a bad agent
has an equilibrium reputation of zero). Thus we must have Vb=V
*. Then the

















(since the right side gives the payoff to pretending to be good). For the good type we
have
μ Vg




















(See Figure 2.) Thus, there are exactly two equilibria. Q.E.D.
In either of these equilibria, it is easy to see that any market beliefs that would
rationalize deviation for the bad type also rationalize it for the good type. Consider
the difference, for either type, between playing some deviation V and playing the bad
type’s equilibrium strategy V*. This quantity is at least as large for the good type as
12 At least this is generically so: some particular functional form for μ Vð Þ might give a turning point
90B ¼ 0 at bV .
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for the bad type, since the change in current payoff is the same while the reputation
effect is (weakly) better for the good type, who gets a higher performance and hence
better posterior reputation on average. Therefore if it is positive for the bad type (i.e.,
the bad type wants to deviate) then it is positive for the good type, and the good type
prefers playing V to playing V*. However, the incentive-compatibility conditions tell
us that the good type is indifferent between playing V* and playing its own strategy
Vg, so it will prefer V to Vg, i.e., will choose to deviate.
It follows from this that an equilibrium refinement in the spirit of Banks and
Sobel’s “divinity” concept (Banks and Sobel 1987) would require out-of-equilibrium
beliefs to satisfy ξ p;Vð Þ  p for V=2 V*;Vg
n o
. Since the good type in a separating
equilibrium is indifferent between playing its own strategy Vg and playing V*, it will
prefer to deviate to within epsilon of V*, earning the same performance (to first
order) as at V* and a positive reputation (by the “divinity” condition above). We can
therefore rule out these two signaling equilibria via this equilibrium refinement.
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